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Denial of Coverage for "Experimental"
Medical Procedures: The Problem of
De Novo Review Under ERISA
INTRODUCTION
The recent proliferation and diversity of medical interventions
have led health care consumers, providers, and third party payors
to disagree regarding the effectiveness of specific procedures in the
management of injury and disease.' While consumers seek access
to their treatments of choice, physicians attempt to balance research
findings concerning innovative approaches with more generally ac-
cepted standards of care, and payors try to avoid increased expense
for unproven therapies.
2
In pnnciple, the decision to attempt a novel course of treatment
should be the subject of discussion and informed consent between
the physician and the patient.3 New medical technology, however,
I Apart from the widely discussed problems of health care cost containment, the
effort to assess the value of various treatments is related to the interest among governmental
and pnvate payors in ways to measure and compare the outcomes'of medical treatments in
order to make both efficient and effective use of finite resources. See Ellwood, Shattuck
Lecture-Outcomes Management: A Technology of Patient Experience, 318 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1549 (1988) (an overview of the topic of outcome assessment); Morreim, Cost
Containment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1719 (1987) (analysis
of the interaction between cost constraints and medicolegal concerns); Morreim, Stratified
Scarcity: Redefining the Standard of Care, 17 LAW MED. & HEALTH CAM 356 (1989)
(recommendations for judicial evaluation of the standard of medical care).
2 See Eddy, Comparing Benefits and Harms: The Balance Sheet, 263 J. A.M.A. 2493
(1990) (review of quantitative and qualitative assessment methodologies); Roper, Winken-
werder, Hackbarth & Krakauer, Effectiveness in Health Care: An Initiative to Evaluate and
Improve Medical Practice, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1197 (1988) (discussion of the federal
government's agenda for outcome assessment).
3 See, e.g., Abrams, Patient Advocate or Secret Agent?, 256 J. A.M.A. 1784 (1986)
(potential adverse effects of payor constraints on role of physician as patient's advocate);
Agich, Rationing and Professional Autonomy, 18 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 77 (1990)
(complex interaction between physician decision making and third party requirements);
Gaylin, Sadier & Sadier, Autonomy-Paternalism-Community-A 15th Anmversary Sympo-
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is rarely unambiguous in its demonstrated efficacy and tends to be
more expensive than established methods.
4
Contracts for payment of health care expenses normally limit
the type or amount of coverage available.5 Such limitations are
influenced by both market pressures and state and federal statutes
that require health insurance carriers to adhere to mimmum stan-
dards of equitable dealing with insured parties. 6 These statutes
generally govern adnimstrative procedures7 deferring to the ex-
pertise of payors' medical panels and treating physicians in the
choice of intervention. Since 1987, however, suits regarding demal
of benefits under employer-sponsored health insurance plans have
frequently come under federal jurisdiction," because of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of provisions of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 9
Insurance coverage for some medical interventions may be de-
med because their efficacy is not proven.'0 The 1989 establishment
of a de novo standard of review for demal of health plan benefits
under ERISA"I has placed federal district court judges in the po-
sition of ruling on the validity of such treatments. This raises
difficult questions regarding the appropriateness of the adversarial
process as a forum for climcal decision making.'
2
sium, 14 HAsTiNcs CENTER REP 5 (1984) (comprehensive survey of changes in the role of
the physician); Siegler, The Progression of Medicine: From Physician Paternalism to Patient
Autonomy to Bureaucratic Parsimony, 145 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 713 (1985) (influence of
payors on physician-patient relationships).
4 Ginzberg, High-Tech Medicine and Rising Health Care Costs, 263 J. A.M.A. 1820,
1820 (1990) (contribution of new technology to cost increases).
See generally Annotation, Coverage and Exclusions Under Hospital or Medical
Services (Blue Cross-Blue Shield) Contracts, 81 A.L.R. 2d 927, 931-33 (1962).
The complex relationship between state regulatory statutes and preemption by the
federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 [hereinafter ERISA], is discussed
by the Supreme Court in three cases that place increasing emphasis on preemption: Met-
ropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981); see
also Engel, ERISA: To Preempt or Not to Preempt, That is a Question!, 22 TORT & INS.
L. J. 431 (1987) (pre-Pilot Life discussion of. preemption clause interpretation); Nelson,
Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux: The Supreme Court's Federalization of Employee
Benefit Law, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 507 (1988) (case analysis and implications).
I See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-50 (1987) (discussing
Mississippi statutes governing administrative procedures).
a Id. at 41.
9 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
1o See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
" See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) [hereinafter
Firestone II] (establishing de novo standard). For applications of this standard, see McGee
v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., No. 87-1721-K (D. Kan., Mar. 27, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed
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The following analysis presents the framework for ERISA pre-
emption of claims appealing a denial of insurance benefits13 and
the recent trend away from deferential treatment of admnistrative
decisions regarding experimental procedures. 14 While courts have
generally reached the same conclusions under de novo review as
under the previous standard, 15 the troubling implications of this
trend suggest the need for a structure that allows more objective
data collection and judicial deterlmnation.'
6
I. ERISA REGULATION OF EMPLOYER-SPONSORED GROUP HEALTH
PLANS
The origins of ERISA17 may be traced to Congressional dissat-
isfaction with the ability of its statutory predecessors, most notably
the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958,18 to curb
abuses by plan fiduciaries.' 9 The definition of an ERISA fiduciary
hinges on the discretion vested in an individual or entity to control
plan management, administration, or investments. 2° The fiduciary
is thus distinguished from one with merely mimsterial duties, who
lacks discretion regarding benefit denial. Although the duties and
standards of care for these fiduciaries derive from the common
law of trusts,21 exculpatory clauses and other sluelds commonly
found in the language of trusts are not available to them.2 Con-
library, Dist. file); Rollo v. Blue Cross-Blue Slueld, No. 90-597 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 1990)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Slueld, 741 F Supp. 586
(E.D. Vir. 1990); Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F Supp. 131 (D.N.J. 1989);
Stnngfield v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 732 F Supp. 69 (E.D. Tenn. 1989).
12 Zweig and Perry, Health Care Goes to Court, Judges Need Access to Impartial
Medical Expertise, Wash. Post, July 17, 1990, § Health, at 5; see also infra notes 156-65
and accompanying text.
," See infra notes 17-62 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 63-91 and accompanying text.
Is See infra notes 92-155 and accompanying text.
'6 See infra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
17 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
,S 29 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1958), repealed by ERISA § 111, 29 U.S.C. § 1031 (1988).
19 See H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& Arm,. Naws 4639, 4642.
20 The relevant portions of the statute, ERISA § 3(21)(A), for employee welfare plans
reads as follows:
[a] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises
any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of
such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or
disposition of its assets or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or
discretionary responsibility in the admimstration of such plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1988).
21 ERISA § 404 (a)(1) provides for a "prudent man" standard of care and reqmres a
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gress explicitly directed that ERISA reform and preempt weaker
state and federal statutes, which had led to "abuses and unsound
practices which jeopardize[d] the security of assets and threaten[ed]
the availability of funds for employees." 23
Like much of ERISA, this language is more applicable to
employee retirement plans than to welfare plans such as those
providing health benefits. The admnistration of retirement plans
is largely a question of prudent investment, while for welfare plans,
such elements as disclosure of the terms of the plan, adherence to
these terms, and fiduciary conflict of interest are often in contro-
versy. The elaboration of guidelines for adnuistration of ERISA
employee welfare plans has been left to the evolutionary process
of case law
A. The Evolution of Preemption
Because mnety percent of all full-time employees in medium
and large companies participate in employer-sponsored health in-
surance,24 any change in health plan regulation has widespread
effects. ERISA includes three provisions that have led to its pre-
emptive regulation of group health plans:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions
of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall super-
sede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan.25
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing m this subchap-
ter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any
law of any state which regulates insurance, banking or securities.76
Neither an employee benefit plan described m § 1003(a) of this
title, which is not exempt under § 1003(b) of this title (other than
a plan established primarily for the purpose of providing death
benefits), nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be
deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer or to
be engaged in the business of insurance for purposes of any
law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies,
fiduciary to act "for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries; and defraying reasonable expenses of admmstering the plan[.]" 29 U.S.C. §
i104 (1988).
- ERISA § 410, 29 U.S.C. § 1110 (1988) explicitly overrides such provisions.
LEOisLATIrvE HIsTORY OF THE EmpLOYEE RETIREmENT INCOME SECURIT AcT oF 1974,
1 SUBcoMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COuM. ON LABOR AND PULC WLFARE, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess., at 204 (remarks of Sen. Javits).
2 Levit, Freeland & Waldo, National Health Care Spending Trends: 1988, HAiTH
AsAIMs, Summer 1990 at 177.
- ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988) (preemption clause).
- ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(2)(A) (1988) (saving clause).
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insurance contracts, banks, trust compames, or investment com-
pames.27
Thus, health insurance acquired as a benefit of employment,
as distinguished from insurance purchased directly from a carner,
is generally subject to federal, rather than state, regulation.2 After
several years of divergent rulings among the circuits, broad federal
preemption was upheld by the Supreme Court in Pilot Life Insur-
ance Co. v Dedeaux.29 Pilot Life disallowed state law tort claims,
such as those for bad faith demal of insurance coverage, when
insurance was provided through a self-funded, employer-sponsored
plan.30 The scope of preemption remains less than comprehensive, 31
but exceptions are rapidly dinumshing. For example, federally pre-
empted plans are shielded from the indirect regulation by which
states govern independent providers of technical services. 32
- ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § i144(b)(2)(B) (1988) (deemer clause). The
difficulty in interpreting this and the preceding "saving" clause arises because statutes are
variously construed as to their regulation of insurance. Generally, the three-factor test
established m the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988), has been applied,
following Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 743-44 (1985) ("[F]irst,
whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk; second,
whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and
the insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance
industry.").
2s At this time, only Montana and West Virginia recognize private actions under
unfair insurance practice statutes. See Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 758 P.2d
58, 63 (finding federal jurisdiction and discussing exceptions); contra McDonough v. Blue
Cross, 131 F.R.D. 467, 468 (April 25, 1990 W.D. Pa.) (Where "ERISA's exclusive enforce-
ment provisions do not vindicate the same interests that the plaintiff's state law claims seek
to vindicate," specifically m the area of compensatory relief, state court jurisdiction may
be found.).
- 481 U.S. 41 (1987). For a detailed discussion of Pilot Life, see Nelson, supra note
6.
'o Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987).
11 See Self-Insurance Inst. v. Gallagher, 909 F.2d 1491 (N.D. Fla. 1989) (unpublished)
(preserving distinction between self-funded and fully insured plans). "Self-funded" plans
customarily involve two layers of admimstration: the quotidian decisions of the employer-
sponsor, and admimstrative guidance in more arcane areas, such as provider credentialing,
utilization review, case management, and quality assurance, from a large and diverse
insurance provider. The majority of courts previously had refused to consider limitations
on employer risk as jeopardizing self-funded status. However, Firestone If has had the
effect of abolishing what was often a very slight distinction between fully insured and self-
funded plans for regulatory purposes. For a decision subjecting assertions of self-funding
to closer examination when stop-loss provisions allowed limitation of employer risk, see
Hall v. Pennwalt Group Comprehensive Medical Expense Benefits Plan, No. 88-7672 (March
29, 1989 E.D. Pa.) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file). Other plans not covered by ERISA
are those made available to government employees, including school districts, plans required
by statute, such as those for workers' compensation, unemployment, and disability coverage,
and certain church plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1988).
32 Advantages thus gained by ERISA regulation include avoidance of expensive and
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Group health plans subject to ERISA regulation may limit
coverage of medical interventions on a variety of grounds,33 but
challenges to the interpretation of specific exclusions are authorized
under ERISA.14 Conversely, the validity of exclusionary language
itself may come under state court jurisdiction when state mandates
fall within the traditional purview of state authority, affect rela-
tions among the major ERISA participants, or have a relatively
minor impact on the plan as a whole. 35 Concerns have been raised
regarding the apparent restraints placed by ERISA preemption on
consumer protection available to health insurance purchasers in the
state courts.3 6 The plaintiff under ERISA not only must bring suit
in federal court, but loses the right to a jury trial,3 7 pumtive
damages, 38 and compensation for mental distress. 39 Monetary com-
burdensome state regulations, greater control over cash outlays, and exemption from state
taxation of insurance prermums, including those used to fund high-risk pools.
33 See supra note 5; for examples of exclusions, see infra note 53.
-1 Under the civil enforcement provisions, ERISA § 502(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)
(1988), a plan participant or beneficiary may sue to recover benefits due under the plan, to
enforce the participant's rights under the plan, or to clarify rights to future benefits. Relief
may take the form of accrued benefits due, a declaratory judgment on entitlement to
benefits, or an injunction against a plan admimstrator's improper refusal to pay benefits.
Such relief also may be sought against a plan fiduciary under 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1988).
35 The courts continue to diverge regarding the relationship between ERISA and state-
mandated provider laws. Compare Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. Frappier, 698 S.W.2d
326 (Mo. 1985) (state law not preempted) with Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Insurance
Comm., 441 A.2d 1098 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982), rev'd, 463 A.2d 793 (Md. 1983) (ERISA
preempts). These laws, as opposed to common-law principles, are frequently given force on
the grounds that they "regulate insurance," a deterrmnative criterion under the McCarran-
Ferguson Act principles. See supra note 27; see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,
482 U.S. 1 (1987); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Neusser, 810 F.2d 550 (6th Cir. 1987).
- 29 U.S.C. § l132(a)(i)(B) (1988) places general restrictions on consequential dam-
ages. See DiPaola, Wrongful Dental of Health Insurance Benefits: Litigating the ERISA
Preemption Defense, FiA. BAR J. April 1990, at 64; Strand & Mickelsen, Will ERISA
Continue to Screen Self-Funded Plans from Regulators' Glare?, Healthweek, July 20, 1990,
at 35. At least one court has found these restrictions inconsistent with the "central policy
goal of ERISA [, which] is to protect the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in
employee benefit plans." McKinnon v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 691 F Supp. 1314, 1315-16
(N.D. Ala. 1988), citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983). Another recent
decision used a procedural loophole to prevent removal, finding that ERISA preemption as
a defense "does not appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint and therefore, does
not authorize removal to a federal court." McDonough, 131 F.R.D. 467, 468 (W.D. Pa.
April 25, 1990), citing Metropolitan Life v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987). This case is
distinguished because benefits were not sought for plaintiff's decedent; compensatory and
wrongful death damages represented interests that would not be vindicated by an ERISA
action in federal district court.
3 See, e.g., Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984).
- Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985), quoting
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981); see also Harris v.
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pensation is limited generally to recovery of plan benefits, although
equitable relief may be granted at the court's discretion. 40 In spe-
cific circumstances, for example, courts have allowed attorney fees
and costs for victorious ERISA plaintiffs.
41
B. Exclusion of Benefits
Health insurance policies commonly exclude benefits for med-
ical procedures found to be "experimental" or "investigational"
in nature.42 In medical usage, a procedure is thus designated when
"there is no consensus on the (a) safety or (b) effectiveness of this
technolqgy to date, there is insufficient evidence to determine its
appropriateness, or it warrants further study; use of this technology
for the given indication in the specified patient population should
be confined largely to research protocols.
'43
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 729 F Supp. 49 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (demal of punitive damages
in health benefit context).
11 See, e.g., Russell, 473 U.S. 134; Johnson v. Dist. 2 Marine Eng. Beneficial Ass'n.,
857 F.2d 514, 517-18 (9th Cir. 1988); Sokol v. Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532, 534-38 (9th Cir.
1986); Powell v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 780 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986); Rollo v. Maxicare of Louisiana, 698 F Supp. III (E.D. La.
1988).
See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988).
4, See, e.g., McGee v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., No. 87-1721-K (D. Kan. Mar.
27, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. File); Rollo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, No. 90-
597 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
42 See, e.g., Jones v. Laborers Health and Welfare Trust Fund, 906 F.2d 480 (9th
Cir. 1990); Exbom v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health & Welfare
Fund, 900 F.2d 1138 (7th Cir. 1990) (gastroplasty); Johnson, 857 F.2d 514 (liver transplant);
Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 846 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1988) (in vitro fertilization);
McGee, No. 87-1721-K (LEXIS) ("coma arousal" therapy); Washington v. Winn-Dixie of
La., 736 F Supp. 1418 (E.D. La. 1990) (hyperbanc oxygen for quadriplegia); Rollo, No.
90-597 (LEXIS) (HDCT-ABMT); Pirozzi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 741 F Supp. 586
(E.D. Va. 1990) (HDCT-ABMT); Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F Supp. 131
(D.N.J. 1989) (ABMT); Stringfield v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 732 F Supp. 69
(E.D. Tenn 1989) (radial keratotomy); Thomas v. Gulf Health Plan, Inc., 688 F Supp. 590
(S.D. Ala. 1988) (bone marrow transplantation); McLaughlin v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.
Co., 565 F Supp. 434 (N.D. Cal 1983) (immune-augmentative therapy). See generally
Annotation, Coverage and Exclusions Under Hospital or Medical Services (Blue Cross-Blue
Shield) Contracts, 81 A.L.R.2d 927, 931-33 (1962).
41 This is the definition used by the American Medical Association's Diagnostic and
Therapeutic Technology Assessment [hereinafter DATTA] program, where "investigational"
appears at the middle of a five-point rating scale, between the "interim" ratings of
"promising" and "doubtful." The DATTA panel decision regarding safety and efficacy is
ultimately based on collapsing the five categories into three, -with ratings of "promising"
weighing in favor of acceptance and ratings of "doubtful" in favor of rejection. "Investi-
gational" ratings, while supporting neither position, have the effect of diminshing the
likelihood of acceptance upon statistical analysis. See, e.g., Alpha-Interferon and Chronic
Myelogenous Leukemia, 264 J. A.M.A. 2137 (H. Cole, ed. 1990).
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These exclusions reflect the complex interactions among the
provider, the patient, and the third party payor. First, treatments
that are undertaken as part of an experimental protocol are often
funded by the scientific or governmental entities sponsoring the
research and take place at no cost to the provider or patient.
44
Second, exclusions of unproven treatments help to curb physician
deviation from accepted standards of care.
45
The third rationale involves the interaction of patient care
reimbursement with the cost of health plan premiums. 46 While there
is no intrinsic reason for new treatments to be more expensive than
established ones, contemporary medical research in areas tradition-
ally resistant to effective intervention often leads to increased costs.
These increased costs usually occur during the early stages of a
new treatment's use in the clinical setting.47 When incurred by the
insurer, these costs are passed on to the employer-sponsor in the
form of higher premiums. Increases in the cost of health insurance
are a subject of significant concern, especially in light of their
disproportionate contribution to costs in the manufacturing sec-
tor. 48 Thus, public policy as well as patient-specific justifications
44 In such cases, requiring insurance reimbursement would have the effect of compen-
sating providers twice for the same procedure.
41 Unproven treatments may thus be excluded on the basis that there is no "medical
necessity" for their provision, as in Washington, 736 F Supp. 1418 (hyperbaric oxygen for
quadriplegia); Shumake v. Travelers Ins. Co., 383 N.W.2d 259 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985)
(Laetrile); Zuckerberg v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 487 N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y. App. Div.
1985) ("Gerson therapy").
46 This is especially true in complex cases where high benefit costs are incurred.
Savings in general are more difficult to demonstrate, as decreased benefit outlays are
balanced against increased adnmstrative costs, higher costs for covered procedures, and
added benefits in specific areas such as home health care, outpatient services, and rehabil-
itation. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CONTROLLING COSTS & CHANGiN PATIENT CARE? THE
ROLE OF UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 143-62 (B. Gray
& M. Field, eds. 1989).
47 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
41 In 1987, spending for health care by business equaled about 6% of total labor
compensation, compared with about 2% in 1965. Levit & Freeland, Health Spending and
Ability to Pay, 10 HETH CARE FiN. REv. I, 1-12 (Spring 1989). Surveys of employer
health insurance premiums have noted increases of 8 to 25 percent for the single year 1987-
88. Gabel, DiCarlo, Fink & de Lissovoy, Employer Sponsored Health Insurance in America,
in Research Bulletin of the Health Ins. Association of Amenca, (Jan. 1989); Higgins,
HEA TH CARE BENEFIrs SuRvEY OF NEW YORK (1989); Levit, Freeland & Waldo, supra note
24. Meanwhile, insurance underwriters have sustained losses so great as to lead several to
withdraw from the group health insurance market, including Kemper, Provident Mutual,
Allstate, and Transamenca Occidental. Meyer & Page, New Era in Utilization Review, Am.
Med. News, 1, 45 (December 9, 1988).
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may explain exclusions on the basis that procedures are unproven
or investigational.
The difficulties encountered by practicing physicians and third
party payors in evaluating new treatments are complicated by the
contingencies surrounding potential benefits from these treat-
ments. 49 The clinical setting, the patient's age, social circumstances,
and the values placed on short- and long-range outcomes interact
to make such decisions highly individualized and difficult to gen-
eralize.50 A test or treatment that is shown to be cost effective only
in a specific patient group is often given to persons outside that
group.51 On the other hand, studies demonstrating substantial ben-
efits for a small group of patients but minimal benefits for others
may lead payors to deny payment for all patients on the grounds
that utilization monitoring would be excessively complex.
5 2
Several levels of evaluation can be triggered by a request for
coverage of a new procedure. Explicit policy language may exclude
coverage for specific procedures, leaving the decision whether to
choose such an exclusionary policy within the discretion of the
insurance purchaser.53 A general exclusion of procedures not "in
accordance with generally accepted standards of medical practice,"
lacking "scientifically proven value," or "experimental or investi-
gational" is commonly found either alone or in conjunction with
specific language excluding certain procedures. Recent insurance
benefits litigation both within and beyond the ERISA context has
led insurers "to search for increasingly precise and understandable
descriptions for contract exclusions . and for defensible criteria
for their application to specific cases."1
54
41 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ASSESSING MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES (1985); Fuchs & Garber,
The New Technology Assessment, 323 NEw ENG. J. MED. 673, 676 (1990).
50 For example, in the case of a common condition, benign prostatic hypertrophy, the
patient's attitude toward different states of health may determine whether surgery is appro-
priate. Barry, Mulley, Fowler & Wennberg, Watchful Waiting vs. Immediate Transurethral
Resection for Symptomatic Prostatism: The Importance of Patients' Preferences. 259 J.
A.M.A. 3010-17 (1988).
, An example is the dubious value of computerized tomography scanning in low back
pain. See Wiesel, Tsourmai, Feffer, Citrin & Patronas, The Incidence of Positive CT Scans
in an Asymptomatic Group of Patients, 9 Spnm 549 (1984).
52 This appears to be the rationale governing the payor's decision to refuse funding
for coma arousal programs in McGee, No. 87-1721-K (LEXIS).
" Common exclusions include reasons for service (e.g., diagnostic testing as opposed
to therapeutic treatments); types of service (cosmetic surgery, routine physicals); specific
providers (psychologists, chiropractors, optometrists); lengths or incidents of service (e.g.,
limit of 30 physical therapy sessions per year); and medical appliances or equipment (glasses,
hearing aids).
s' INsTrrTE OF MEDIC wE, supra note 49, at 225. The exclusion language given in
1990-91]
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Beyond the level of policy language, decisions regarding exclu-
sion of certain procedures may be referred on a case-by-case basis
to the medical director of the sponsoring plan, who then consults
with an advisory board and computerized technical data bases.
55
These individuals and resources also engage in a continual process
of evaluation and reformation. New procedures are approved for
coverage, while previously authorized treatment may be elimnnated
from future coverage.5 6 Such decisions are subject to judicial review
with the obvious public policy goals of monitoring uniform treat-
ment of plan subscribers and ensuring that effective treatments are
not excluded from coverage merely to enhance the plan's profita-
bility 57
An innovative method of coping with the lack of insurance
coverage for new medical procedures is the extension of reimburse-
ment for treatments within the context of approved clinical trials.58
Reilly, 846 F.2d 416, 419, reads,
Services and procedures which are experimental/investigative in nature. Ex-
perimental/investigative means the use of any treatment, procedure, facility,
equipment, drugs, devices or supplies not yet recognzed as accepted medical
practice by Blue Cross & Blue Shield United -and any of such items requiring
federal or other governmental agency approval and for which approval has
not been granted at the time services were rendered.
In this case, the in vitro fertilization procedure at issue was specifically excluded.
11 Technical criteria are listed in Pirozzi, 741 F Supp. at 590-91, as consisting of the
following five questions:
(1) Is the drug or device approved by the Food and Drug Admimstration
("FDA") to market for the particular indication or application in question?
(2) Is there sufficient informationin the peer-reviewed medical and sci-
entific literature to enable Blue Cross to make conclusions about the drug's,
device's, or procedure's safety and efficacy'
(3) Does the available scientific evidence demonstrate a net beneficial
effect on health outcomes?
(4) Is the drug, device or procedure as safe and efficacious as existing
diagnostic or therapeutic alternatives?
(5) Can the drug, device or procedure reasonably be expected to satisfy
criteria 3 and 4 when applied outside the research setting?
For proposed federal criteria, see Medicare Program: Criteria and Procedures for Making
Medical Services Coverage Decisions that Relate to Health Care Technology, 54 Fed. Reg.
4302 (1989), which includes lack of FDA approval, explicit research purposes, and inade-
quate evidence regarding safety and effectiveness as indices of "experimental and investi-
gational" status. See also supra note 53 and accompanying text.
16 Thus, in Pirozzi, 741 F Supp. at 593, the fact that Blue Cross's evaluation of
HDCT-ABMT had not been updated since 1988 was found to vitiate the defendant plan
administrator's case. Id.
-1 See infra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
Newcomer, Defining Experimental Therapy-A Third-Party Payer's Dilemma, 323
Naw ENO. J. MED. 1702 (1990); Experimental Therapy-Who Shall Pay, 324 Naw ENO. J.
MED. 1291 (1991) (letters to the editor presenting investigators' points of view on the subject
of payment for unproven treatment). See also infra note 132 and accompanying text.
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A specific treatment protocol at a designated institution becomes
not merely a "preferred provider," but the uniquely favored pa-
tient care setting.59 This option has much to recommend it: patients
who might otherwise be unwilling to do so are encouraged to enroll
in randomized trials, thereby facilitating determination of treatment
efficacy; insurance dollars are added to the resources available for
such trials; and patients have greater freedom of choice than in
systems that simply deny coverage for unproven therapy 60 It is
important to note, however, that the nature of such trials dictates
that a significant number of patients are randomly assigned to
groups not receiving the treatment in question. 61 Furthermore, the
insurance company choosing this route would exercise discretion
regarding the choice of trials to be funded. Finally, the insurance
company must possess expertise in study design and be able to
prioritize funding.62 Recent innovations in the use of clinical trials
will be followed with interest by the growing number of parties to
the debate over coverage of "investigational" treatments.
II. STANDARD OF REVw
Until February 1989, judicial review of ERISA fiduciary be-
havior in benefit denials was limited to an "arbitrary and capr-
cious" standard. 63 In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v Bruch,64 the
Supreme Court rejected this standard in favor of de novo review
in the context of pension plan benefit demals.6s When the de novo
standard is applied to health plan benefits, a court abandons
deference to the fiduciary's decision and examnes evidence regard-
,, An example is the Blue Cross and Blue Shield sponsorship of ABMT climcal trials
at the National Cancer Institute. See Winslow, Blue Cross to Help Pay for Clinical Test of
Controversial Breast Cancer Therapy, Wall St. J., October 30, 1990 at B4; Southwick,
Blues Pay for Clinical Trials of Cancer Therapy, Healthweek, Nov. 5, 1990 at 1.
10 Newcomer, supra note 58, at 1703.
61 Id.
6 Payors are placed in a position similar to that of the reviewer of an academic
funding application and understandably would be reluctant to fund less than optimally
designed studies. Id.
63 See Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 846 F.2d 416, 423 (7th Cir. 1988),
citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
-489 U.S. 101 (1989), aff'g Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134 (3d
Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Firestone 1].
" Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 102 (1989) [hereinafter
Firestone fl].
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Ing the extent of a procedure's acceptance by the medical com-
munity in order to determine the validity of that decision.6
A. The "Arbitrary and Capricious" Standard
The "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review67 is primarily
an assessment of compliance with the benefit determination pro-
cedure stated in the policy, and is thus readily amenable to judicial
scrutiny. The court's deference to the fiduciary's decision is based
on the rationale that the plan trustees have superior expertise in
the application and interpretation of their plans, as well as the
ability to balance the interests of the plan beneficiaries. 68 Even
when the court might interpret a plan's language differently, the
actions of plan sponsors, insurers, or admimstrators are not con-
tested if they are based on plausible readings.6 9
The "arbitrary and capricious" standard is effectively identical
to the abuse of discretion standard, 70 which was applied to ERISA
" See infra notes 108-39 and accompanying text.
67 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 43 (defining the arbitrary and capricious
standard for a decision by a federal agency); see also Pokratz v. Jones Dairy Farm, 771
F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1985) (adopting the Motor Vehicle standard for an administrator
of an ERISA plan); Dennard v. Richards Group Inc., 681 F.2d 306, 314 (5th Cir. 1982)
(arbitrary and capricious standard under ERISA analyzed according to (1) uniformity of
construction; (2) fair reading and reasonableness of that reading; and (3) unanticipated
costs); Note, Judicial Review of Fiducitary Claim Denials Under ERISA: An Alternative to
the Arbitrary and Capricious Test, 71 CoRNEa L. R. 986 (1986); Comment, The Arbitrary
and Capricious Standard Under ERISA: Its Origins and Application, 23 DuQMasNE L. R.
1033 (1985). But see Firestone II, 489 U.S. at 115 (summary and rejection of the arbitrary
and capncious standard).
" Firestone I, 828 F.2d at 144 (rejecting the rationale claiming greater expertise on
the part of the trustee as the reason for the deference given to the trustee's determination
and accepting the rationale that the trustee is better able to balance the interests of the plan
beneficiaries); see Comment, supra note 67, at 1049-50 ("The courts have no experience in
admimstering employee benefit plans, and are therefore content to defer to the decision of
the trustees when that decision is supported by the evidence or by rational explanation.").
6Matthews, Common ERISA Issues Affecting Group Health Care Plans, HEALTH
LAw HAiNaoo 139, 143 (A. Gosfield ed. 1990).
70 Id. at 144. The abuse of discretion standard has been retained m cases where plan
fiduciaries were explicitly given total discretion over benefit determinations. Anderson v.
Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 907 F.2d 1072 (11th Cir. 1990) (reversing district court de novo
decision in beneficiary's favor because discretion found to have been conferred); Sweeney
v. Gerber Products Co., 728 F Supp. 594 (D. Neb. 1989) (discretion retained, fiduciary
action upheld); compare Lowry v. Bankers Life and Cas. Ret. Plan, 871 F.2d 522 (5th Cir.
1989) (discretion retained; fiduciary action upheld) with Brown v. Apes-Pittsburg Corp., 11
E.B.C. 1034 (6th Cir. 1989) (no discretion, fiduciary reversed). See also Egert v. Connecticut
General Life Ins. Co., 900 F.2d 1032, 1036 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussion of qualifications
placed on fidicuary discretion and interaction among "abuse of discretion" and "arbitrary
and capricious" standards).
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claims by analogy to claims arising under Section 302(c)(5) of the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).71 LMRA standards
reflect pnnciples of the common law of trusts, 72 which defer to the
discretion of the trustee in allocation decisions unless the decisions
are found to constitute an abuse of discretion. Decisions may be
found to be abusive when "the trustee has an interest conflicting
with that of the beneficiary, ' 73 or when "the trustee's interpreta-
tion of a plan is in direct conflict with express language in a
plan."74 Before the Firestone II decision, the concept that "a court
is not to substitute its judgment ' 75 for that of an ERISA fiduciary
was widely accepted.
B. The De Novo Standard
The de novo standard differs from the "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard in two important ways. First, the court does not
defer to fiduciary judgment in a de novo review, seeking instead
to determine the interpretation of the policy language that most
accurately represents the intentions of all parties to the agreement.
7 6
Second, in making this determination, the court is not limited to
the evidence available to the defendant fiduciary and its represen-
tatives, or even to the information that a good faith decision would
have taken into consideration.7 7 The court has the option to ex-
amine "all the circumstances and such other evidence as is
not inadmissible." 7 8 This second distinction has implications that
have not yet been fully realized regarding the introduction of
scientific evidence into the judicial context.
7 9
7' 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1988). The "arbitrary and capricious" standard was also
necessary to assert federal junsdiction over LMRA suits, unlike ERISA, which explicitly
authonzed such suits in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(f). See Firestone 11, 489 U.S. at 109-10.
- ERISA, as a statute regulating pension as well as welfare plans for employees, is
founded upon the law of trusts. See Firestone 1, 828 F.2d at 141. However, courts reviewing
fiduciary investment behavior have applied higher standards. See Note, supra note 67, at
989.
" Firestone I, 828 F.2d at 141 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187
comment g (1959)).
74 Dennard, 681 F.2d at 314 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Comment, supra note 67, at
1047-55. This line of reasoning is applied most logically when the beneficiary's interest in
a trust is a matter of equity, rather than contract, and more specifically, when the beneficiary
has not contributed to the creation or funding of the trust.
7 Motor Vehicle, 463 U.S. at 43; accord Reilly, 846 F.2d at 420 ("We may not
undertake a de novo review as to whether we agree with Blue Cross' decision.").
76 Firestone II, 489 U.S. at 112-13.
Id., citing 3 W FRATCIER, SCOTT ON TRusTs § 201, at 221.
72 Id., citing REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS, § 4 comment d (1959).
79 See infra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
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Firestone IIs novel contribution to the standard of review was
its holding that the de novo standard should be used "to evaluate
the propriety of the involved [benefit] system's actual operation
and its content and design, as well as the selection of its admims-
trative service providers and the review of its operations." 0 The
Supreme Court held that this standard should be utilized whenever
there is an absence of explicit plan language giving the admmstra-
tor complete discretion over the construction of uncertain terms or
eligibility determinations.8' Such discretion is not inherent to the
plan 2 and must yield to judicial interpretation of the plan's terms
in light of applicable rules of the law of trusts.83
The two rationales behind the "arbitrary and capricious" stan-
dard-trustee expertise in the management of pension plans and
the ability to allocate the resources equitably among the
beneficiaries-were examnned and rejected in Firestone L The
argument for superior expertise was invalidated by inquiry into the
type of expertise required, which was found to be legal rather than
adminstrative. 5 Further, "there is a significant danger that the
plan administrator will not be impartial, ' 86 and that his expertise
will be used to the detriment of the plaintiff beneficiaries. The
second rationale also encounters potential conflicts of interest:
determinations in favor of individual beneficiaries will place finan-
cial burdens on the insurer and employer, rather than on other
potential beneficiaries in whose favor the trust is intended to op-
erate.8
7
Congress rejected the de novo standard of review under ERISA
in 1982,8 but the reasons for this rejection are obscure and failed
Matthews, supra note 69, at 163.
" Firestone II, 489 U.S. at 115.
82 Id. at 112; see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
81 The specific provision of the law of trusts upon which the Court relies states that
"the extent of the duties and powers of a trustee is determined by the terms of the
trust as the court may interpret them, and not as they may be interpreted by the trustee
himself or by his attorney." Firestone II, 489 U.S. at 112, citing 3 W FRATCHER, supra
note 77 (emphasis added by the Court).
" See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
" Firestone I, 828 F.2d at 144. This argument is addressed infra notes 92-155 and
accompanying text.
" Id.
7 Id. at 144-45. While this argument may be valid in the short term for individual
cases, the cumulative effect of increased benefits has had adverse effects upon other
employee beneficiaries.
- See H.R. 6226, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in Pension Legislation:
Hearings on H.R. 1614 et al. Before the Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations of
the House Committee on Education and Labor, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 60 (1983).
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to convince the Supreme Court of the validity of the "arbitrary
and capncious" standard.8 9 The new standard was announced in
Firestone II as applicable "regardless of whether the plan at issue
is funded or unfunded and regardless of whether the administrator
or fiduciary is operating under a possible or actual conflict of
interest."' 9 The only exception to this rule would be a benefit plan
giving explicit discretion over the matter at issue to administrators
or fiduciaries. In most cases brought subsequently under this stan-
dard, such language has not been found, and de novo review has
been applied. 9'
III. APPLICATIONS OF TE DE Novo STANDARD
The standard of review established by Firestone 11 has, as the
appellant corporation and its amici feared, given rise to "more
litigation by employees, participants, and beneficiaries who wish
to assert their right to benefits." 92 The additional weight granted
" Firestone II, 489 U.S. at 114, citing Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824, 837
n.12 (1983) ("failure to act on the proposed bill is not conclusive of Congress' views on
the appropriate standard of review").
1o Further, the attention to questions of impartiality characterizing the Firestone I
decision is explicitly elirmnated in the Supreme Court's ruling. See Firestone II, 489 U.S.
at 115.
91 The l1th Circuit has recently reversed two lower court decisions which applied de
novo review where fiduciary discretion in plan language dictated the narrower standard.
See Anderson, 907 F.2d 1072; Jett, 890 F.2d 1137. When such discretion is found by the
court, an "abuse of discretion" standard is applied according to which review is limited to
the evidence presented to the plan fiduciary, and abuse is found only when factual findings
are "clearly erroneous." See, e.g., Jones v. Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund, 906
F.2d 480, 481 (9th Cir. 1990); Dewitt v. A State Farm Ins. Co. Retirement Plan, 905 F.2d
798, 800-01 (4th Cir. 1990). But see QuesTech Inc. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 713 F
Supp. 956, 963 (E.D. Va. 1989); see also Jett, 890 F.2d at 1140-41 (Johnson, J., dissenting)
(standard of judicial review where lower court applied de novo standard inappropriately).
In Dewitt, the following language was found to grant such broad discretionary powers as
to make the abuse of discretion standard applicable:
The plan admimstrator shall have the power to make all determinations
that the plan requires for its admmstration, and to construe and interpret the
plan whenever necessary to carry out its intent and purpose and to facilitate
its admimstration. All such rules, regulations, deterrmnations, constructions,
and interpretations made by the plan administrator shall be binding.
Dewitt, 905 F.2d at 801. In Jones, the effect of similar language was buttressed by the fact
that the reviewing entity included union reprsentatives. Jones, 906 F.2d at 481. It is obvious
that discretionary language is likely to be written into an increasing proportion of plans
and that delegation of fiduciary duties will be closely monitored to ensure compliance with
the allocation of the discretion.
91 Brief for the American Council of Life Insurance et al. as Amtct Curiae, at 10-11,
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) [hereinafter Firestone I].
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plaintiffs' claims under the de novo standard was aptly brought
into play in Aubrey v Aetna Life Insurance Co.,93 where policy
language demonstrated internal contradiction.94 By examining the
entire policy in light of its own "plain and dispositive language"
and placing this language in the context of statutory principles that
the carrier claimed to uphold, 95 the court was able to allocate
benefits in a manner that not only aided the plaintiff beneficiary,
but arguably resulted in "lower long-term cost to the Plan,"9' and
thus to all potential beneficiaries.
A distinction must be drawn between the therapeutic interven-
tions for which argument is made in cases recently decided under
the de novo standard and the claims of "ersatz or self-proclaimed
healers or figures from the fringes of medicine'"' that characterize
many appeals of health benefit demals.98 The current discourse in
the federal district courts has been directed toward areas of genuine
controversy. Issue definition is clouded, however, by adnmistrative
problems such as imprecise plan language,9 failure to disclose
current plan exclusions,' ° and ambiguous statements by plan ad-
ministrators.10'
Unlike the de novo review in Aubrey and Firestone, the appli-
cation of this standard in a suit challenging benefit demal on the
886 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1989).
, In Aubrey, language granting benefits for costs associated with pregnancy, regard-
less of its diagnosis at the time of employment, conflicted with "pre-existing condition"
language requiring that no diagnosis or treatment of a condition be made within three
months of employment. Aubrey v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 886 F.2d 119, 120-21 (6th Cir.
1989).
, Aetna contended that the apparently exceptional language for pregnancy was in-
cluded to establish compliance with the Pregnancy Discrimnation Act of 1978, amending
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 122.
Id. at 123.
Pirozzi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 741 F Supp. 586, 594-95 (E.D. Va. 1990).
Shumake v. Travelers Ins. Co., 383 N.W.2d 259 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (Laetrile
and other forms of nutritional therapy found to be a necessary and required treatment for
lung cancer); Jacob v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 758 P.2d 382 (Or. 1988) ("Gerson therapy"
case decided in plan's favor on both medical necessity and "expenmental or investigational"
grounds).
See Pirozzi, 741 F Supp. at 590 (the terms "experimental" and "investigative"
were not explicitly defined, but could be construed with reference to adjacent language);
DiDomemco v. Employers Co-op. Indus. Trust, 676 F Supp. 903, 907-08 (N.D. Ind. 1987)
(liver transplants were excluded from reimbursement in one section of the plan and author-
ized in another).
NO Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 846 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1988); Egert v. Connec-
ticut General Life Ins. Co., 900 F.2d 1032 (7th Cir. 1990).
10, McKinnon v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 691 F Supp. 1314 (N.D. Ala. 1988); McGee
v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., No. 87-1721-K (D. Kan. Mar. 27, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist. file).
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grounds that the procedure is experimental or investigational goes
beyond the judicial application of law to a specific set of facts.'
°2
When a court addresses the question whether a specific procedure
is in fact experimental, it must investigate and rule on the validity
of medical opimon. 03 The court is then vulnerable to the influence
of medical experts called to testify on behalf of the validity of
their own procedures of choice. °4 In the highly competitive bio-
medical research environment, 05 significant support may be mar-
shalled for procedures that have not achieved acceptable levels of
efficacy. °6 The intellectually challenging nature of these decisions
is exacerbated by the urgency of judicial determinations when
procedures are presented as being the last possible course of treat-
ment for dying patients.ec The cases that have arisen under the de
novo standard illustrate this problem.
A. The "Experimental or Investigational" De Novo Cases
Among the many experimental or investigational procedures
subject to de novo review, the most frequently litigated thus far
has been the use of autologous bone marrow transplants for high
dosage chemotherapy ("HDCT-ABMT") in persons with recurrent
cancer.10 8 Other treatments brought into the judicial arena have
"" Pirozzi, 741 F Supp. at 590 ("[T]he Court must resolve the ambiguity by reference
to the Plan's structure and to the testimony of experts. ").
1*1 Zweig & Perry, supra note 12, at 5.
104 Id.
101 See, e.g., Healy, Innovators for the 21st Century: Will We Face a Crisis in
Biomedical Research BrainpowerP 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1058-64 (1988); Palca, Hard
Times at NIH, 246 SCIENCE 988-90 (1989).
I See infra notes 112, 124-30, 134-36 and accompanying text.
107 See, e.g., Rollo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, No. 90-597 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 1990)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file) ("When the parties were first before me less than six
weeks ago, I was called upon to decide whether eight year old Tishna Rollo could live or
whether she must die, a humbling and sobenng decision."); Pirozzi, 741 F Supp. at 587
("Plaintiff pointed out that her condition was one well-documented to progress rapidly and
that only an expedited resolution of this dispute could be effective. Left on this Division's
normal five to six month trial docket, the dispute likely would be overtaken by events and
rendered urelevant."); Dosza v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F Supp. 131, 140 (D.N.J.
1989) ("If a preliminary injunction is not granted, ultimate relief for the plaintiff will come
too late Failure to provide treatment will probably result in death in a matter of
months.").
10 HDCT-ABMT is a procedure by which bone marrow is extracted ["har-
vested"] from the patient's body, frozen, and stored while the patient receives
large, near lethal doses of chemotherapy. In some cases the chemotherapy is
administered in doses in excess of one thousand times the standard dose. This
high dose chemotherapy kills not only the cancer, but much of the patient's
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included radial keratotomy 109 and "coma arousal" programs." 0
The first case testing HDCT-ABMT against the experimental/
investigational criterion in the federal courts was decided in the
plan administrator's favor, using the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard, in June 1988.111 At that time, there was no debate re-
garding the investigational status of the procedure for recurrent
metastatic breast cancer 112 Thus, the issues were confined to demal
of coverage for bone marrow transplantation following coverage
for precautionary extraction of bone marrow ("harvesting")."'
Authorization for coverage had apparently been granted in a sim-
ilar case, but that case was clearly distinguished by the plan ad-
mimstrator and the court.11 4 The court engaged in something
approaching a de novo analysis despite its stated reliance on the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard. Specific investigation of the
language associated with the plaintiff's consent to bone marrow
harvesting, which repeatedly emphasized the experimental and con-
tingent nature of this procedure, buttressed the court's finding in
favor of the plan admimstrator's denial. 1
5
remaimng bone marrow as well. This secondary effect, untreated, could well
be lethal to the patient. Thus, after the chemotherapy is completed, the
patient's stored bone marrow is returned to the patient's body to replace the
damaged bone marrow and thereby "rescue" the patient. A patient undergoing
HDCT-ABMT is hospitalized, often in intensive care, for approximately 10
days of the treatment and requires full-time medical attention. The entire
procedure costs approximately $100,000. Most health care facilities that pro-
vide the treatment require pre-payment, or a substantial deposit.
Pirozzi, 741 F Supp. at 588; see also Beck, The Politics of Breast Cancer, NEwswEEK,
Dec. 10, 1990, at 62, 65 (discussion of federal funding for cancer research and court battles
for insurance coverage of AMBT treatment); Cowley, In Pursuit of a Terrible Killer,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 10, 1990, at 66, 67 (discussion of effectiveness of new breast cancer
treatments).
,09 Stnngfield v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 732 F Supp. 69 (E.D. Tenn. 1989).
110 McGee, No. 87-1721-K (LEXIS).
"' See Thomas v. Gulf Health Plan, Inc., 688 F Supp. 590, 595 (S.D. Ala. 1988).
112 Id. at 592. "Agreed Fact No. 5: It is undisputed that autologous bone marrow
transplantation for the treatment of breast cancer is still considered experimental or inves-
tigative, even though such treatment is no longer considered experimental by Blue Cross
for certain other types of cancer." Blue Cross is currently funding this treatment for
participants with breast cancer who qualify for a National Cancer Institute study of its
efficacy. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
M Thomas, 688 F Supp. at 593-94. Plaintiff contended that because Blue Cross had
paid for the bone marrow harvesting, it should also cover the transplantation, although the
contingent nature of the harvesting procedure was amply explained and documented.
"" Id. at 595. The precise nature of this claim is not discussed in the opinion, and the
court does not find it to be relevant to plaintiff's argument.
"I Id. at 592-94.
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One year later, another HDCT-ABMT case advanced the tran-
sition from the "arbitrary and capricious" to the de novo standard.
In Dosza v. Crum & Forster Insurance Co.," 6 the court applied a
de novo standard following Firestone, but noted that "whether the
de novo or abuse of discretion standard was applied, defendants'
determination of noncoverage did not conform with the specific
terms of this particular Medical Plan." 1 7
Dosza is particularly troubling in light of the court's analysis
of an apparent conflict between the definition of experimental
procedures in the plan as presented to the plaintiff and that applied
by the organization that provided technical consultation to the plan
administrator."' The consultant's policy required that a treatment
be supported by a consensus in peer-reviewed literature, while the
plan language itself merely required that it be "commonly and
customarily recognized throughout the doctor's profession as ap-
propriate in the treatment of the sickness or injury," and "neither
educational nor experimental in nature nor provided primarily for
research purposes.""' 9 In finding for the plaintiff, the court stated
that ABMT "is commonly and customarily recognized throughout
[the plaintiff's expert witness's] profession, i.e., those administering
ABMT treatment."' 2 Discounting peer-reviewed publications con-
testing this endorsement, the court in effect decided that the en-
thusiasm of researchers regarding their area of investigation
amounted to irrefutable evidence of its validity 121
Two reported 1990 cases have subjected HDCT-ABMT to de
novo review in the federal district courts. Pirozzi v Blue Cross-
Blue Shield of Virginia'2 again examined the procedure for breast
cancer, while Rollo v Blue Cross-Blue Shield of New Jersey'2
116 716 F Supp. 131 (D. N.J. 1989). The procedure had been recommended for the
treatment of recurrent multiple myeloma.
"- Id. at 140.
. Id. at 142.
Id. at 134.
' Id. at 139. It is noteworthy that six months after the Dosza decision, a federal
distnct court in Nebraska applying the "arbitrary and capncious" standard in the presence
of discretionary language found that HDCT-ABMT was "in an early stage of development"
and definitely witun the boundaries of the "experimental or investigational" exclusion. See
Sweeney v. Gerber Products Co., 728 F Supp. 594, 596 (D. Neb. 1989).
121 Id.
'" 741 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Va. 1990).
123 No. 90-597 (D. N.J. Mar. 22, 1990) (LEXIS,. Genfed library, Dist. file); see also
Cole v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst. 738 F Supp. 42 (D. Mass.
1990) (preliminary injunction issued requiring reimbursement for HDCT-ABMT treatment
in case of testicular cancer).
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assessed its value in the treatment of Wilms tumor, a much less
common condition.12 4 Both courts found for the plaintiffs and
rejected Blue Cross's contentions that the procedure lacked proven
value. 125 The court reached this conclusion on the basis of extensive
exanunation of evidence presented by the plaintiffs' expert wit-
nesses.'26
The major distinction between these cases arises from the in-
cidence of the condition for winch HDCT-ABMT is proposed. The
availability of research supporting or refuting the plaintiffs' claims
is related to the number of persons suffering from the same type
of cancer as the plaintiffs. This contrast also illustrates the diffi-
culties encountered by insurance carriers when they undertake a
determination regarding the validity of a procedure under unusual
circumstances.
Breast cancer is relatively common, even in the extreme case
exemplified by Mrs. Pirozzi, while Wilms tumor in children is a
rare form of cancer, especially in its relapsed state.127 While the
Pirozzi court had ample evidence both for and against the efficacy
of the treatment,2 the studies relied upon in Rollo were based on
small groups, the largest of winch included only twenty subjects.12 9
The Blue Cross Medical Director in Rollo was thus in the difficult
position of soliciting unpublished reports of small therapeutic groups
(three and four subjects) from specialists in the field whose state-
ments had not been subjected to impartial review 130 In Pirozzi,
significant published evidence could be marshalled to support the
procedure's efficacy in breast cancer, reducing Blue Cross to a line
of defense based on the absence of randomized "Phase III" tnals.' 31
While Phase III evidence is highly supportive of a treatment's
effectiveness, it is, as the Pirozzi court notes, ethically difficult to
I" See generally Breslow, Epidemiological Features of Wilms' Tumor: Results of the
National Wilms' Tumor Study, 68 J. NAT'L CANCER INsT. 429 (March 1982). Although
Wilms tumor is the second most common solid tumor in children, its incidence (363 cases
per year in the U.S.) is still extremely low in comparison with the leukemias. The existing
standard of care has resulted in a five-year survival rate of 81%.
"2 Rollo, No. 90-597 (D. N.J. March 22, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
12 Id. at 22.
127 Id.
In Pirozzi, 741 F Supp. at 592 nn. 13-14. This evidence, furthermore, included peer-
reviewed publications as well as testimony of expert witnesses.
I" Rollo, No. 90-597 (LEXIS) (only eight of the twenty children were in complete
remission at the time of the report).
I3 Id. at 20-21. The court criticizes the Blue Cross Medical Director harshly for failing
to give credence to these anecdotal reports.
"I Pirozzi, 741 F Supp. at 594.
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enroll patients in such studies when they believe that assignment
to placebo treatment might jeopardize the patients' last chance of
survival. 1 2 The court's holding in Mrs. Pirozzi's favor thus suggests
standards of acceptable benefit determination, while the Rollo
holding leaves the carrier under the threat of moral condemnation
for failure to consider scientifically questionable and unpublished
research findings.
A somewhat different application of the de novo standard
appears in McGee v Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp.1 33 In McGee,
payment was demed for treatment received in a "coma arousal
program." 1 34 The patient was a young woman who had suffered a
serious traumatic brain injury This case can be distinguished from
the three previous de novo reviews of experimental or investiga-
tional procedures because the patient's survival was not at issue.
Furthermore, the treatment for which payment was disputed had
already taken place at the time of the decision. Numerous ambi-
guities cloud the picture: the "coma arousal" program was rms-
takenly (but understandably) assumed to be inappropriate for a
patient not in a state of coma;1 35 the plan's language was self-
contradictory with regard to coverage; 136 and the physician review-
ers changed their minds about the value of the requested treat-
ment.
1 37
Despite these features, McGee presents a clearer example of
the problems inherent in de novo review than the cases involving
HDCT-ABMT The McGee court based its evaluation of the pro-
132 Id. Plaintiff's expert witness cited an HDCT-ABMT study that had failed to enroll
patients for over a year. Insurer-funded participation in clinical trials may accelerate the
pace of such enrollments. More innovative approaches to assessment of new medical
interventions include multivariate analysis of nonexperimental data, meta-analysis, decision
analysis, and econormc modeling. Fuchs & Garber, supra note 49, at 673-76.
03 No. 87-1721-K (D. Kan. Mar. 27, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
1'3 Id. at 28. Like HDCT-ABMT, coma arousal programs are both expensive and
controversial. According to the expert testimony of Sheldon Berrol, M.D., in McGee, they
are also somewhat misleadingly named, as they are not of proven value for persons in a
persistent vegetative state (the condition recently publicized m the case of Nancy Cruzan),
but are of use for persons at lugher levels of post-traumatic arousal.
" Id. The McGee court criticizes the plan's consulting physical medicine and rehabil-
itation specialist for failing to make this distinction.
136 An exclusion for "long-term physical therapy and rehabilitation services" had
apparently been deleted in a supplementary communication to the plaintiff policyholder;
this finding was contested by the plan administrator. Id. at 7-9.
'"Id. at 14-25. In summary, the court concludes that the physician's "subsequent
reversal of his previous position was both unreasonable and came too late." Id. at 40-
41.
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cedure in question on the testimony of a single, albeit expert,
plaintiff's witness. No publications, peer-reviewed or otherwise,
were cited; no experimental trials were introduced as evidence.'38
Like the oncologists testifying on the plaintiffs' behalf in the
previous cases, the McGees' expert witness had devoted his consid-
erable energy and intellect to the improvement of coma patients,
and his testimony is not discounted. 13 9 The defendants' failure to
marshal evidence to counter his undocumented assertions is puz-
zling, yet it does not excuse the court's disproportionate reliance
on his testimony
B. Problems with De Novo Review
Three problems are readily identifiable in the de novo review
process. First, the courts themselves acknowledge that, despite the
increased judicial burden created by this intensive review, decisions
have not differed substantially from those that would have been
made under an "arbitrary and capricious" standard. 14° Second, the
addition of large and unanticipated areas of coverage by insurance
carriers may call into question their adherence to the standards of
fiduciary responsibility required by ERISA.14 1 Finally, these deci-
sions inject an unacknowledged normative element into the judicial
examination of scientific evidence. 142
In three of the four de novo cases previously discussed, the
court states that the application of an "arbitrary and capricious"
standard would have led to the same result even if the new standard
had been used. 43 Despite exhaustive medical reviews in the three
HDCT-ABMT cases, the courts appear to base their findings on
the abuse of discretion standard when they criticize fiduciaries for
"I See id. at 28. Like many rehabilitation interventions, coma stimulation does not
lend itself to the type of experimental design used for medical and surgical treatments in
acute care.
1,9 Dr. Berrol is Director of Medical Rehabilitation at San Francisco General Hospital
and editor of the Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation.
"40 See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
'1 See infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
142 See infra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
,,1 Pirozzi is the only case to date in which the decision was based solely on the results
of de novo review. See Rollo, No. 90-597 (LEXIS) ("Assuming that the arbitrary and
capricious standard applied, I have no difficulty in finding that Blue Cross/Blue Shield's
decision falls far short and, as all of the foregoing should indicate, it surely was wrong.");
Dosza, 716 F Supp. at 157; ("The evidence demonstrates quite clearly that whether the de
novo or abuse of discretion standard is applied, defendants' determination of noncoverage
did not conform with the specific terms of this particular medical plan.") (italics added).
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inconsistent application of review standards or questionable good
faith in administrative interactions. 144 Likewise, although the McGee
court applies the de novo standard explicitly, its review of the
insurer's behavior and award of attorney fees reflect the criteria
that would be applied under an "arbitrary and capricious" stan-
dard. 145 The sole post-Firestone case to date decided in favor of
the insurance company also reaches a conclusion that would easily
be duplicated under the older standard. 14' Thus, the value of de
novo review may be called into question on the ground that it
requires significant additional judicial time and resources while
failing to alter the ultimate finding.
The tendency of de novo review, as applied thus far, to grant
beneficiaries access to very costly treatments of questionable benefit
may be found to violate the fiduciary duties established by ERISA
§ 404(a)(1). 147 The ERISA fiduciary is under a duty to "discharge
his duties solely in the interest of the participants and bene-
ficiaries . so as to minimize the risk of large losses."' 14 When
it grants a single participant disproportionate benefits dubiously
related to plan provisions, the fiduciary risks jeopardizing the fiscal
integrity of the plan as a whole.
Such imprudence has the obvious consequence of placing all
other participants' benefits in peril of loss. This risk is most com-
monly illustrated in the case of the small employer whose insurance
premiums rise to intolerable levels following the serious illness of
a single employee. 49 Regulatory mechanisms that control insurers'
pricing practices have the effect of spreading the cost of court-
authorized treatment among the entire community of premium-
payers. If the fiduciary is forced by the courts to reimburse health
care providers for questionably effective treatment costing hun-
I" Were the abuse of discretion standard applicable, both Prudential and
Crum and Forster have a direct and conflicting interest in the determination
of coverage. Prudential is not merely the impartial, disinterested administrator
of Crum and Forster's Plan, as it purports to be. Its determination apparently
is one which controls payments under its own medical policies.
Dosza, 716 F Supp. at 139.
"4' McGee, No. 87-1721-K (LEXIS).
146 Stringjield, 732 F Supp. 69, 70 (genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
procedure was "experimental"; summary judgment demed).
"I Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1988); see supra notes 21-23 and accompanying
text.
29 U.S.C. §§ i104(a)(1)(A), (C) (1988).
' See, e.g., The Crisz in Health Insurance, CONSUMER REPORTS, August 1990, at 533
(examples of small businesspersons whose insurance premiums were raised or whose carrier
refused to renew insurance contracts following illness or injury of employees).
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dreds of thousands of dollars, it is, in effect, forced to violate the
standards of prudence established in the explicit language of ER-
ISA.150
The application of the de novo standard of review in cases of
investigational procedures has been cast in terms of scientific as-
sessment, but this characterization of the legal discourse ignores a
strongly value-laden component. In reality, de novo review includes
two prongs: the scientific and the normative. 51 Judicial investiga-
tion of the risks and benefits of a given procedure for the patient
leads to a choice between the positions of physician advocates and
remains at least nominally within the scientific forum. However,
once a procedure that falls outside the established scope of covered
health services has been found to be scientifically valid, the decision
that it should be reimbursed for a specific beneficiary is a nor-
mative social judgment regarding resource allocation.
While the imposition of judicial values to, override a profes-
sional standard of practice is not unknown, 152 It is unusual in case
law It is not inappropriate for the court to interpret plan provi-
sions in light of the values expressed by the contracting parties
within the context of trust law as manifested in ERISA. 5 1 Absent
explicit recognition of the value-laden nature of such a determi-
nation, however, the courts may fail to account for the potential
consequences of their holdings in the broader social context. 54 The
results of de novo review thus far, despite expressed reliance on
the interpretation of contractual intent, appear to place the insurer
in the shoes of the physician. The insurer is obligated to do all it
can for the patient's benefit, regardless of the interests of other
plan beneficiaries or society as a whole. 5
110 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
M For a discussion of this problem in the context of malpractice litigation, see
Hirshfeld, Economic Considerations in Treatment Decisions, 264 J. A.M.A. 2004 (October
17, 1990).
" See, e.g., Helling v. Carey, 519 P 2d 981 (Wash. 1974), reaffirmed, Gates v.
Jensen, 595 P 2d 919 (Wash. 1979).
Ws The terms of trusts are "determined by the provisions of the instrument as inter-
preted in light of all circumstances and such other evidence of the intention of the settlor
with respect to the trust as is not inadmissible." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 4,
comment d (1959).
114 Such consequences include the effect of authorizing extraordinarily costly treatments
on other potential beneficiaries and the plan itself. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying
text.
135 See generally W KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 185-93 (5th ed. 1984)
(discussion of standard of conduct in professional malpractice context); Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs, Current Opimons of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of
the American Medical Association (1989), Opinions 2.03 and 2.09.
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CONCLUSION
De novo review has given the courts a much broader field from
which to glean medical evidence than was available under the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard. Beyond the adversarial pos-
tures of those testifying for and against the validity of a specific
procedure, the dispassionate expressions of the scientific commu-
nity should be recogmzed as legitimate elements of the decision
making process. If courts are to be required to make de novo
determinations regarding medical interventions, they must have
access to empirical scientific findings, instead of being limited to
the evidence offered by either party to the action. 156
Searching questions may be directed to the plaintiffs' expert
witnesses: 1) To what extent is their professional advancement
linked with the procedure they advocate? 2) How much of their
compensation is tied to the number of such procedures performed?
3) What evidence argues against their position?1 7 Research spe-
cialists also may lack fundamental understanding of the terms of
a health insurance policy as they relate to investigational proce-
dures. 58 The failure of the defendant fiduciaries' counsel to raise
such obvious questions is puzzling. Their relatively passive and
parochial insistence upon adherence to review protocols suggests a
fundamental lack of understanding regarding the scope and poten-
tially determinative nature of de novo review
The growing legitimization of practice guidelines and technol-
ogy assessment programs argues in favor of their incorporation
into the judicial process. 59 In the past, the lack of timely, reliable
information has led to such anomalous situations as reimbursement
-1 Kinney & Wilder, Medical Standard Setting in the Current Malpractice Environment:
Problems and Possibilities, 22 U.C. DAvis L. R-v. 421, 442-46; Zweig & Perry, supra note
12, at 5; Couch & Rodriguez, Legal Aspects of Clinical Outcome Management, in PHYsiciA
MANAGERS AND TE LAW (J. B. Couch, ed. 1989); Hirshfield, Practice Parameters and the
Malpractice Liability of Physicians, 263 J. A.M.A. 1556.
Ms "When expert judgment proceeds in the absence of direct empirical evidence about
a particular climcal practice, a frequent circumstance, the general scientific reasoning or
normative (ethical, professional) principles supporting the expert judgments should be de-
scribed." INsTruTE o MEDICInE, supra note 46.
I Such rmsunderstanding is evidenced by the following quote from such an investi-
gator: "I feel very strongly that when there is no good standard treatment, the best treatment
is investigational treatment, and the patient should be covered." Southwick, supra note 59,
at 37.
159 Practice guidelines have been under development for several years with varying
success. See Kinney & Wilder, supra note 156, at 424-38; INsrruor OF MEDICiNE, supra
note 46, at 103.
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for total hip replacement by most carrners when the procedure was
still classified as experimental by the Food and Drug Adminstra-
tion. 160 As a result, governmental and professional groups are
moving rapidly to bridge the information gap between experimental
and clinical practice.
The November 1989 amendments to the Public Health Service
Act' 6' mandate the development and promulgation of "clinically
relevant guidelines that may be used by physicians, educators, and
health care practitioners to assist in determining how diseases,
disorders, and other health conditions can most effectively and
appropriately be prevented, diagnosed, treated, and managed clin-
ically,"' 62 a task to be completed by January 1991. These guidelines
are to "be based on the best available research and professional
judgment regarding the effectiveness and appropriateness of health
care services and procedures" and to "include treatment-specific
or condition-specific practice guidelines for clinical treatments.
for use in reviewing quality and appropriateness of medical care."' 63
Medical specialty groups, health insurers, and utilization review
organizations also have been involved with the development of
practice guidelines.' 64 While such guidelines are currently in a state
of rapid evolution, their formulation attests to the ability of cli-
nicians to develop criteria for the dispassionate evaluation of med-
ical evidence in contexts such as the de novo review process.165
As currently applied, de novo review of health benefit denial
because a treatment is of unproven value is vulnerable to scientific
partiality, emotional appeals, and inadequate intellectual ground-
ing. By condoning this pseudoscientific debate, the courts appoint
themselves as arbiters of medical decision-making. Generalization
of de novo review would have profound effects on the efforts of
"6 Bunker, Fowles & Schaffarzaick, Evaluation of Medical Technology Strategies, 306
NEw ENG. J. MED. 620, 621 (1982).
161 42 U.S.C.A. § 299 (West Supp. 1989).
1 Id. at Part B, § 912(a)(1).
163 Id. at Part B, §§ 912(b)(1), (3).
I6 Among these are the American Board of Medical Specialties, the Amencan Medical
Association, the Council of Medical Specialty Societies, the RAND Corporation, the Health
Insurance Association of America, and the Group Health Association of America. See
INsTrruTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 46, at 23-24.
163 Recognition of these guidelines and programs also has significant implications in
the area of medical malpractice litigation. Recent initiatives in the state of Maine establishing
a 5-year demonstration project on practice guidelines suggest legislative sensitivity to the
potential implications of this problem in a variety of medicolegal areas. See ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 2857.3 (Supp. 1990).
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employers, health policy analysts, and legislatures to control the
proportion of national resources devoted to medical care. Cases
arising thus far under de novo review have suggested that the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard is adequate in regulating fi-
duciary procedures and would avoid enmesbing the courts in the
process of scientific investigation. If the de novo standard is re-
tained, however, the courts must have access to the full range of
empincal evidence, rather than being forced to rely upon the
testimony of those experts chosen by the parties in support of their
positions.
The de novo standard of review includes both an attempt at
objective assessment of medical science and a value judgment re-
garding the resources appropriately expended on a given patient.
The recognition that de novo review is ultimately normative as well
as scientific will encourage the courts to consider the broader social
implications of their decisions.
Julia Field Costich
1990-91]

